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The problem of compensation to employees of nuclear research facilities presents difficult issues
to the practicing attorney. The major stumbling block to presenting a well-documented case in
court is the worker's inability to discuss the full range of duties at his or her work station over the
course of employment. In addition the worker is barred from discussing the types and
concentrations of chemicals and radioactive substances to which he or she is exposed, thereby
limiting the ability of a competent physician to prepare an opinion on the causation between
effects of exposure and disease. This paper presents the dilemma faced by the authors, who
represented over 40 workers with cancer at the nuclear research facility in Dimona, Israel. It
shows how the authors extricated themselves from this difficult dilemma by creating a panel of
scientific experts under the court's auspices and with the court's blessings, which obviated the
need for heavy procedural rules of court that apply in torts litigation in Israel. The scheme as
developed and approved by the court can serve as a model to other countries where security
matters are as important as matters of environmental health. - Environ Health Perspect
105(Suppl 6):1595-1597 (1997)
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Introduction
What follows is a case study, told in
chronological fashion, about the attempts
ofthe authors to enhance the protection of
worker health at Israel's largest nuclear
research facility. The Dimona research
facility was built amid great secrecy in the
1950s and that secrecy has surrounded the
operations ofthe facility since its creation.
This paper does not deal with production
at the facility, as this remains a state secret
and is irrelevant to the presentation. What
is relevant, however, and not a state
secret, is that the nuclear research facility
by its very existence exposes its employees
to radioactive materials. (Information
obtained from interviews with 41 nuclear
research facilityworkers and their families.)
This paper is based on a presentation at the
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What is less known is that because it is a
research facility the workers are also
exposed to a cocktail ofchemicals, some of
which are known carcinogens. (Information
obtained from interviews with 41 nuclear
research facilityworkers and their families.)
This paper suggests that the nuclear
research facility made every effort to protect
its workers from radiation exposure but
failed to foresee the potential health effects
ofexposing them to dangerous chemicals.
Therefore, it failed to set up proper protec-
tive mechanisms for chemical exposures
comparable to those used to protect work-
ers from radiation exposure. Further, the
paper reveals that the mechanisms devel-
oped at the nuclear research facility for
monitoring health effects among radiation-
exposed workers were inadequate when the
plant was first established and remained
inadequate for some time. These protective
measures probably were state ofthe art at
the time they were initiated, therefore one
can hardly criticize what was then accepted
as standard practice for both protective and
monitoring equipment.
One can, however, criticize the medical
procedures established to monitor potential
health effects ofexposure from all sources.
It appears from the numerous cases pre-
sented to us that the nuclear research facil-
ity failed, even taking the then standard of
practice into account, to devise a mecha-
nism for the early detection of cancer
among workers; that the facility failed to
develop a mechanism for assessing the
veracity, relevance, and significance of
worker complaints, worker exposure, moni-
toring systems, casualties, accidents, and
medical overviews. As a consequence there
has been no systematic approach to the
early detection ofcancer from radiation and
other dangerous substances at the plant.
This can be inferred because ofthe 41 cases
presented to the authors, only 2 were dis-
covered by the nuclear research facility
medical staff. (Information obtained from
interviews with nuclear research facility
workers and their families.) The other 39
cases were detected by a general medical
practitioner or by the worker.
The First Exposure
R. Laster became involved with the nuclear
research facility in 1986 when a facility
worker who had been exposed to chemical
substances filed a claim for social security
benefits asking for recognition ofhis sick-
ness as a work-related disease (1). The
worker in question had lost a kidney to
cancer. A case was made to the court to
prove the connection between exposure to
dangerous substances and kidney loss.
The case emphasized factors normally
not found in a typical worker compensation
case. The two key factors were: a) that the
nuclear research facility used its influence to
slow down the process in court by not pre-
senting information or by using delaying
tactics; and b) the authorwas unable to dis-
cuss the case in depth with the client
because the client was forbidden to discuss,
even with his attorney, his work and expo-
sure to named chemicals at the nuclear
research facility. After hours, weeks, and
months ofdiscussions, debates, and court
hearings, the attorney was able to piece
together an account ofthe worker's expo-
sure to chemical substances in the labora-
tory. The attorney was also able to obtain a
portion ofthe worker's medical file at the
nuclear research facility through coopera-
tion ofthe facility's legal advisor and under
court pressure.
The medical file revealed that the
worker had undergone periodic checks at
the nuclear research facility as required by
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the facility's internal regulations. Yet no
one at the facility told the worker that ura-
nium had been found in his blood during
one ofthe checks. Nor did this marker lead
the medical research team at the facility to
follow up its health effects. This apparent
oversight did help in the court case, how-
ever, because it allowed medical opinions
from two experts to show that there was a
possible connection between the uranium
presence and the kidney cancer. At the
same time, the nuclear research facility
failed to get an opposing medical opinion.
The case was finally resolved through an
agreement between the parties affected by
the court decision. The agreement led to
compensation to the worker by both the
nuclear research facility and Israel National
Insurance Uerusalem, Israel).
In-depth Review
This case led the authors to undertake an
in-depth review of the legal framework
within which the nuclear research facility
operated to protect its workers from expo-
sure to radiation and other dangerous sub-
stances. The research included a review of
all Israeli legislation protecting workers
from ionizing radiation as well as that cre-
ating the framework for occupational
health physicians' examination ofworkers
in plants using dangerous substances. It
was discovered that the Minister of Labor
was empowered by legislation to pro-
mulgate regulations protecting workers
exposed to radiation and other dangerous
substances and the Minister ofHealth had
similar powers to protect those exposed to
radiation or radiation substances. Reg-
ulations had been promulgated by both
ministers, but after a close reading ofthe
legislation and correspondence with the
Ministry ofLabor, the authors discovered
that the two nuclear research facilities in
Israel had been granted an exemption from
these regulations. These regulations have
since been replaced by the following regu-
lations: Regulations for Safety at Work
(Workers in Ionizing Radiation) 5751-
1991 and Regulations for Safety at Work
(Health and Safety ofWorkers in Ionizing
Radiation) 5753-1992.
It was discovered that the legal advisor
to the nuclear research facility convinced
the Ministries ofLabor and Health and the
Prime Minister's office that internal regula-
tions at the nuclear research facility were
more stringent than regulations passed by
the ministries and therefore worker health
would be better protected if the ministry
regulations were not applied to the nuclear
research facility. The internal regulations
unfortunately were more ofa guideline for
monitoring and protecting worker health
than strict protective measures. In addi-
tion, violation of internal regulations
would not bring about a criminal sanction,
whereas violation of a ministry regulation
probably would. The internal regulations
required periodic medical checks of the
workers, but workers were denied access to
their medical files at the facility and there-
fore did not know what information these
files contained. The authors, therefore,
had to devise a way to get access to the
medical files denied the workers. Using
right to know regulations published in
1984 (2), the authors demanded all back
medical files, all monitoring data at the
worker's station, and all exposure levels for
hazardous chemicals.
At first the legal advisor to the Atomic
Energy Commission rejected the authors'
request for this information, claiming that
the regulations only came into effect in
1984 and in any case did not apply to the
nuclear research facility. Under pressure
from the Israel Attorney General's office,
the legal advisor to the nuclear research
facility released medical records for the
entire period the worker was exposed on
the job even before 1984, the year the right
to know regulations were enacted. These
data, however, pointed to another inherent
defect in the monitoring mechanisms at
the nuclear research facility. The authors
discovered that there had been no moni-
toring of chemical substances at the
facility; onlynuclear substances were moni-
tored. Therefore, no data were available for
levels of exposure ofworkers to chemical
substances at the facility.
Because there was no monitoring of
exposure to chemical substances at the
facility, the medical staffwas not checking
workers for exposure to chemicals and
their effect on worker health. Further
examination of the records revealed that
the facility's medical staffhad not corre-
lated information about accidents at the
facility and the onset of disease among
workers. Also, no methods were used to
internally detect chemicals or radiation in
a worker's body even though it was known
that workers ate and drank in areas where
there was exposure to chemicals and
radioactive substances. There were no
cross-checks of events and causation nor
were the workers fully informed of the
deleterious effects of chemical substances
as they had been about the health effects
ofnuclear substances.
Appeal to the Supreme Court
After the authors' in-depth review was
presented, a meeting was held with the
nuclear research facility's union representa-
tives. R. Laster explained the results ofhis
study. Union leaders were shocked to find
that ministry regulations to protect workers
from ionizing radiation did not apply to
workers at the nuclear facility. A decision
was then made to attack the exemption on
the grounds that it was an administrative
act so unreasonable as to be void. The case
went to Israel's supreme court, known as
the High Court ofJustice, which acts in all
cases in which aggrieved citizens have
complaints against the state (3). Simply by
filing the case in the High Court ofJustice,
the Ministries of Health, Labor, and
Environment redrafted the regulations
applying to workers in ionizing radiation.
However, because ofpressure from the
nuclear research facility, not all provisions
ofthe regulations were made applicable to
the workers represented by the authors.
Therefore, the petition to the high court
was retained until a formal hearing could
be held on the issue. The high court, how-
ever, balked at this particular point. The
court argued that ifthe full exemption had
been reduced so that approximately 80%
ofthe regulations (4) applied to workers at
the nuclear research facilities, they would
not interfere with the Ministries' decision.
After the successful attack on the
exemption a number ofworkers approached
the authors for help to secure compensation
for their cancers, which were attributed to
exposure to dangerous substances at the
nuclear facility. In addition, several widows
attempted to secure compensation for the
deaths oftheir spouses.
Rightto Know: Intervention
bythe District Court
The authors decided they would pursue a
different route with the second group of
cases. They decided not to file a claim in
court unless they received more informa-
tion from the nuclear research facility,
which apparently was not forthcoming.
Therefore, a precedent-setting court case
was filed in the District Court ofJerusalem
(5). The case was not based in torts but
rather on the inability to file an action in
court without further information. The
court was asked to require the nuclear
research facility to provide all information
necessary to allow the claimants to file a
case in court, including but not limited to
medical files, exposure data, and monitor-
ing results. In a hearing before the District
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Court judge, the attorney representing the
government argued that the case could not
be filed because the code of procedure
made no allowance for a case for informa-
tion. She argued that the case should have
been filed as a case in torts for negligence
with a medical opinion attached and a
request for information.
The authors argued before the court
that a case in torts could not be filed with a
medical opinion attached because there was
insufficient information available on which
to base the medical opinion. The court, rec-
ognizing the authors' plight, pressured the
government representative to compromise.
The compromise called for the creation ofa
scientific panel whose members would
receive security clearance to review all cases
at the nuclear research facility, discuss all
matters with theworkers, and make a deter-
mination about causation with regard to
exposure and disease.
The Compromise
Even after this 1994 decision the nuclear
research facility succeeded in stalling the
creation of a scientific panel for an addi-
tional 2 years. Requests were made to the
court and to the Attorney General's office
before the mechanism for creating the sci-
entific panel was finally prepared, signed,
and filed in court in 1995. The agreements
as filed were given the effect ofa judgment
in court in 1996 (6).
Based on this agreement the parties met
over a period ofa year and worked out the
fine points for the creation of a scientific
panel with security clearance that could
reviewworker data from the nuclear research
facility and determine causation with regard
to exposure and cancer. Following is an
outline of the agreed-upon process for
appointment ofapanel:
* Each side chooses a physician who has
knowledge about radiation and chemi-
cal exposures and their respective effects
on humans. These physicians will serve
on the panel.
* The two physicians chosen then choose
a third person to serve on the panel
from a list drafted by the two parties.
This third person should be an expert
in the field ofeither radiation or other
hazardous substances.
* The panel receives written arguments
from the parties before its deliberation.
* The panel may question a worker and
enter the nuclear research facility, ifnec-
essary, after proper securityclearance.
* The panel then makes a determination
if the cancer from which the patient
suffers or has suffered (in the case ofa
claimant who is not alive) is connected
to his or her exposure to radiation or
any other hazardous substance(s) at
the nuclear research facility. Only
when this determination has been
made can a claim be processed for
compensation. Ifthe panel determines
that there is no cause and effect corre-
lation a claim for compensation will
not be filed.
Ifa claim for compensation is filed with
the authors to be filed in court, the worker
(the next ofkin in some cases) would also
file a claim for national insurance with
Israel National Insurance. This would
ensure that ifthe workerwere indeed found
to have a claim for exposure to hazardous
substances on the job, he/she or his/her sur-
viving spouse would be compensated by
National Insurance.
Conclusion
The agreed-upon compromise steps listed
above are designed to work in a situation
in which security matters are of utmost
importance in a plant where workers have
been exposed to hazardous substances.
The system is useful in many ways. First,
it protects both the state interests to
ensure confidentiality as well as the inter-
ests of public health practice. It also
enables information to be made available
to an objective scientific panel with secu-
rity clearance to make hard decisions
about causation, reduces the number of
cases in court and the time to settle cases
that have to be filed and processed, and it
enables a single panel to review numerous
cases (in this particular situation, over 40
cases) within in a shorter period of time
than it would take for the court to review
the same number of cases. At the same
time, security is maintained bykeeping the
cases out ofthe courts and therefore away
from the exposure these kinds ofcases oth-
erwise would receive at the hands of the
local press and communications media.
The importance ofclose control over sci-
entific panel operations and media expo-
sure (which would be lacking in an open
court proceeding) is relevant to the Atomic
Energy Commission.
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